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AbstractThis paper aims to analyze the current conflict over Iran’s nuclear program from a series
of unique apertures pertaining to the relationship between the United States and Israel. An initial
historical analysis is offered to examine the lead up to a conflict a half century in the making.
The analysis looks at the historical relationships between the United States and Israel and the
United States and Iran. Bringing both timelines together at the culmination of the nuclear
conflict in the early part of this century illustrates how the relationship between the
United States and both countries has created a fog; obscuring the coming solution of the conflict.
The relationship the United States has with Israel is further analyzed to demonstrate how the
decades long interconnectedness between the two countries has lead to strong domestic support
inside of the United States for Israel. It is this support, including the infamous “Israel Lobby”,
the paper cites as a key hurdle for the Obama administration to surpass on its way to a nuclear
accord with Iran. The dilemma is further addressed from multiple positions (geo-strategic, geopolitical, diplomatic) before the paper moves to a conclusion on the issues; suggesting the United
States continue its current path towards diplomatic relations with Iran regarding the nuclear
issue, moving away from the domestic pressures ignorantly over supporting Israel’s position
against such a deal.
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Preface-

Often lost in the symphonic sea, the musical triangle projects a perfectly clear and harmonious
sound. With one precocious strike it chimes a crisply because of its imperfect design. The triangle is
broken at one end, allowing the sound waves to move continuously along the alloy without colliding with
one another. The musical triangle can be used in describing many instances where a break between three
entities evocatively leads to a more harmonious peace. Tensions continue to grow amongst the United
States, Iran, and Israel over Iran’s nuclear program because there is not break between any of the three
capitals. The United States has a clear commitment working with Tehran; while Israel - Iran geopolitical
hatred continues to escalate, and the Israeli lobby meanwhile creates a more cohesive bond to
Washington. There is too much pressure on the triangular relationship structure for peaceful negotiations
to occur, signaling the time to ease a part of the correspondence for greater harmony overall.
I have chosen to write about the United State’s current dilemma of shifting away from Israel
because it is a topic too often turned away from in academia. Going to school in Washington I am
continuously reminded how strong our nation’s support for Israel is; whether it is through lectures,
speeches, or even student events where Israel is portrayed in a positive light. Any views from the
opposition are hushed under the fear of sounding anti-semitic. I find this dangerous, because it leads to
ignorance, and throughout history nothing has been the cause of more conflict than ignorance. Robert
Kennedy once explained how “there are those men who look at the way things are and ask why, and then
there are those men who look at the way things are not and ask why not?” I hope to be one of those latter
men, and I hope to pose certain questions in your mind, through my work here, about the overall political
structure in the Middle East. I will leave it to yourself to find an answer, but I hope at least the questions
will arise of whether the current structure is sound, and how it might be changed for the better?

-Andrew Falacci
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Methodology:
Such a complex topic requires a complex method of analysis. before moving ahead with any work
I began with learning more about the general issues of the Middle East (Israel, Iran) and the United States.
I read history books, both of the encyclopedia variety and personal accounts of history from such figures
as formerU.S Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. After gaining a valuable historical base I jumped to the
current affairs, watching testimonies given by U.S Secretary of State John Kerry to the U.S House
Committee of Foreign Relations, reviewing other hearing transcripts, listening to political commentary,
and reading the latest press articles on the Iran nuclear deal. Many of my colleagues, in working on their
papers, were able to jump straight into a literature review of their subject. Before moving on to secondary
opinion pieces I found it necessary to gain my own perspective understanding. Thankfully my topic
occupied much of the current news ticker and there was a lot to analyze. I then conducted a full literature
review on the topic — reading past and present viewpoints (a full digest of this review will be provided in
the following section). Much of the literature review was made up of current pieces because of how
recent the topic is. I actually found watching the Sunday morning political talk shows in the U.S was
much more helpful in understanding the issue than reading past journal articles because the expert guests
of the program were using the most up to date information.
The topic is multifaceted and I took the initiative to understand as many of them as I could. This
involved reaching out to experts across Europe. My first contact was Dr. Jubin Goodarzi of Webster
University’s Geneva campus, an expert on Middle East politics and an Iranian citizen, who helped me
focus my project and gave me a better understanding of relations in the Middle East involving the United
States. I then met with Pieter Cleppe, the president of the Brussels based think tank, Open Europe. Mr.
Cleppe is an expert on sanction policy and he was very helpful in my understanding of the nature of
sanctions and how it related to the conflict with Iran. I was then provided the opportunity to meet with a
U.S diplomat who works as an Iran Watcher at the United States Embassy in Paris. He has asked to
remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the topic, but his first hand insight on Iran relations with the
U.S was invaluable. I still needed, however, to learn more about the nature of arm negotiations; so I flew
to London to meet with Rob van Reit, the leading disarmament associate for the World Future Council
Foundation think tank. We talked about the overall environment of disarmament negotiations and the
present challenges involving the Iran deal. This was insightful as it gave me a real perspective of the task,
something different from the speculations I had read during my literature review. Finally, I met with Marc
Finaud, a former French diplomat and an associate at the Geneva Center for Security Policy. He has
published a lot of work on the U.S — Israel relationship and its implications on Middle East security. He
helped explain much of the current tensions and cleared up a lot of rhetoric being offered by more biased
sources. I could have done more work, but with the limited time and budget allotted I do believe my
research can be viewed as quite thorough. With that said, this topic continues to change day by day and it
is imperative for one to keep up with the news.

6

Falacci

Literature Review:
As I have previously stated, my literature review most likely contrasts from that of my
colleagues. I found primary source testimonies, transcripts, and speeches more useful than reading
articles published in various journals around the globe. The primary reason for this was relevance as my
topic is part of current affairs, but the other part was bias. As the paper will make clear, Israeli relations
with the United States are surrounded in a sea of bias, where the Israeli perspective is more frequently
projected in a fair light. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walts are two of the notable scholars who have
breaker away from this American trend, and even uncovered much of the reason behind it. Their 2006
piece, “The Israel Lobby and American Foreign Policy”, first published by the Harvard Kennedy School
of Government, raised much controversy by pointing a finger at Israeli domestic forces in the United
States for faulty American foreign policy. The piece was quite insightful and represented a strong contrast
to the literature I had been reading about the historical build up to the conflict between Israel and Iran.
What was even more interesting, though, was the fallout after the paper was published and the out cry
from critics. These articles showed me the true nature of what Mearsheimer and Walts had been
explaining and was a pivotal point in my research.
Analyzing the different criticisms, or praises, of “The Israel Lobby and American Foreign Policy”
gave me a better understanding of the political environment inside of the U.S pertaining to Israel and Iran,
and it also lead my to Tony Judt, the late scholar from New York University. I truly appreciated Judt’s
courage to publish pieces criticizing the American public of being fogged by the fear of anti-semitism. I
found his work honest and insightful. Response interviews he gave showed me the dillema of acting the
way he did and outlined the struggle of battling the status quo of the Israeli perspective existing within the
United States. This guided me to the core principle of my paper — illustrating the fog that is currently
clouding the U.S view on Middle East politics.
However, as I have previously stated, I tried to stick to more historical based literature in an
attempt to form my own subjective view of the situation before making any analysis. To accomplish this I
read many historical accounts including: “To Support Any Friend”, “American Orientalist”, “Nixon,
Kissinger, and the Shah”, all books telling the story of American relationships in the Middle East from the
Eisenhower administration up until more modern events. I also enjoyed, “World Order”, Henry
Kissinger’s historical account of world affairs, which gave me a good baseline for the historical construct
of current global affairs involving the U.S, Israel, and Iran.
I also took to my own historical research as I reviewed past U.S presidential speeches and
statements of the latter decade involving Israel and Iran. I want to analyze any patterns of rhetoric. My
most notable focus was looking at the past State of the Union speeches by both President Bush and
President Obama, as well as debate coverages from the 2008 and 2012 elections, where a nuclear Iran
occupied much of the talking points. Other presidential literature proved useful, such as President
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Clinton’s account of the Camp Davis talks between Israel and Palestine in the 1990s. However, the most
insightful presidential piece was President Obama’s opinion piece, “Renewing American
Leadership”,published in Foreign Affairs Magazine in 2007 leading as part of his campaign. It outlines
his view of a needed change in American policy towards the Middle East and represents a clear contrast
between the ideals of the Bush administration. It was here, through Obama’s will to change, where I
found the true problem of the fog blinding U.S foreign initiative in the region, and it is here I realized the
future president’s true desire and courage to solve it. That work — courage — brings me to possibly the
most important book present in my literature review.
I have used “Profiles in Courage” published by then Senator John F. Kennedy in 1956 throughout
this work because I believe it perfectly describes the problem at hand and represents a historical analysis
of the challenges in solving a problem where an American populous is in the way of an apparent solution.
I found it compelling how Kennedy’s advice in the book can be used by the current president to solve a
conflict Kennedy himself had a hand in beginning. Overall, my literature review is not as traditional as
one might suspect. I did not simply analyze both sides of the argument over the connection between the
U.S and Israel before coming to a conclusion. The topic required more. It required a full historical
understanding, in addition to primary sources, to avoid the bias of the topic. I have come out of such a
review understanding much more than I did going into it, and I hope this paper will offer something to
your understanding of the issue at hand.
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Introduction:
In 1956, a young and lamed up, United States Senator from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
set out to write a book. The book was published and won the Pulitzer Prize; aiding the senator in his quest
for the White House in 1960. President Kennedy, throughout his tenure, would navigate a cold diplomatic
global environment where influence was the sought after and relationships were born. The relationship
between the United States and Israel has been one of the lasting effects of President Kennedy’s
administration.
“Profiles in Courage”, eventually published in 1957, provides a unique political theme of
difference, best presented by Kennedy himself, as a “faith that the people will not condemn those whose
devotion to principle leads them to unpopular courses”1, because “a man does what he must - in spite of
personal consequences, in spite of obstacles and dangers and pressures - and that is the basis of all human
morality”2. It is humbling to see history make a full circle where one president’s actions now meet his
ideals a half century after his passing. Today, the strong, often viewed as symbiotic, relationship between
the United Sates and Israel is threatened by a presidential administration looking to establish peace with
Iran - searching for that differential morality.
Over the last fourteen months the United States has rediscovered a lost diplomatic relationship
with Iran. Secretary of State, John Kerry, has made history by siting down with Iranian leaders to
negotiate a nuclear accord. This seemingly unprecedented diplomatic occurrence has been mirrored by an
anxious and aggravated Israel, who has maintained one of the strongest post WWII relationships with the
United States. As tensions build the United States will be forced to make a choice. Such a choice has
been on the table before, but the ever so close relationship between Israel and United States has kept U.S
foreign policy resolved to Israeli interests, often leading to greater conflicts in the Middle East.
Presidential administrations since Kennedy have been unable to move away from Israel for many
different reasons, with the largest being the strong domestic Israel lobby existent in the United States. For
decades, the United States has stood by Israel, supporting its defense, advocating on its behalf in the
United Nations, and strategically establishing it as a regional power. Throughout American schools young
scholars, asked of the importance of Israel, will immediately affirm, exactly portraying the country’s
politicians from all parties.
The general consensus, whether created by the Israel lobby or a host of other factors, is definitive
— the United States must stand with Israel, and we must. Israel is a strong ally to have in the Middle
East, and our linked culture and similar ideals demonstrate the necessity to stand by one another. With this
said, in the words of Winston Churchill, “ The history of any alliance is the history of mutual
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2
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recrimination among the various people”3. Sometimes a relationship can fog the true aspirations of two
connected actors. Such a fog is thick and often difficult to navigate for it is met with heavy opposition and
can often lead to subversion.
This paper will analyze the paralleled histories of United States’ relations with both Israel and
Iran to showcase the inceptions of quarrel, and to attempt to blow away some of the fog; which has
blinded our perception of a conflicted region. Once a brief history is outlined, the paper will illustrate the
current domestic challenges existing in American society prohibiting resolution over the Iran nuclear
accord, mainly by identifying the Israel lobby and depicting how such a powerful machine has altered
America’s view of the world and ability to act correctly. Finally, the paper will address the Obama
administration’s apparent change of policy, regarding the current affairs of the nuclear deal — ultimately
analyzing the diplomatic tack from Israel towards Iran.
It can be said that Israel and the United States are threatening their own security, and that of the
greater globe, with their over-adhered relationship in the context of a nuclear Iran. The Obama
administration is in a position to tack away from the hegemony the United States has built in Jerusalem,
and focus on the geopolitical superpower rising in Iran. A fortified Israel lobby stands in its way; flexing
its political power and projecting negative propaganda and portraying Iran in a harsh light during ever so
sensitive negotiations. The relationship between the United States and Israel has clearly fogged the
window of U.S foreign policy, but the winds are clocking back and forth and the change of the Obama
administration may just be enough to blow the fog out, presenting a new outlook for the United States in
the Middle East.

3
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A History — The United States and Israel:
On today’s world stage the United States and Israel are seen as having an almost symbiotic
relationship4; however this has not always been the case. Many believe the United States has been a
strong supporter of Israel since its inception in 1948, but in reality relations with the new state remained
stagnant for more than a decade. While both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had drawn out a
plan to invest in the greater Middle East for under a “Monroe Doctrine” type foreign policy5; they did it
through transnational oil companies investing in the region. It was not until a cold winter day in 1961
when thoughts of United State diplomatic support for Middle East states began to truly arise.
In his inaugural address, President Kennedy made the stance to “support any friend, and oppose
any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty”6. The initiative was heard throughout the Middle
East, and leaders came eager to set up ties with the new American administration. Kennedy’s goal was not
simple friendship, it was strategic relationships to keep Middle Eastern states close to the United States
and away from the ‘Red Soviet Wave’. The U.S had economic, oil, and geopolitical interests in the region
and wanted to work on creating a loyal block of states to spite the Soviet threat. The two most prominent
leaders listening to Kennedy’s speech were Israeli leader Ben-Gurion and Egyptian President Jamal Abd
al-Nasser.
The Eisenhower administrations had attenuated relations with both Israel and Egypt following the
Suez canal conflict. In addition, the American popular media, in the fallout from WWII, was portraying a
kinder vision of Israel than it was of the Arab states, mostly due to sympathies over the Holocaust and a
shared idea of democratic values. The Arab states were beginning to bee aggravated by such inequality.
Kennedy was set to change this, as made clear in his reception speech at the democratic national
convention in 19607. The Kennedy administration is not known for its work in the Middle East, but the
young president made unaccustomed strives towards multilateral appeasement, mainly with both Israel
and Egypt: the first Hawk weapon sales to Israel and an active rapprochement campaign with the Nasser
government. Although the policies were view controversial by domestic authorities and condemned by the
Arab states loyal to the United States, such as Saudi-Arabia, the new plan began to warm ties in the the
Middle East, and gave the United States a newfound foothold in the region - something it desperately
needed in the prow of the cold war.

4

Ian J. Bickerton, “America’s Special Relationships”, p. 174
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Little, Doughlas. “American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945” p. 3-7.
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The new friendships would not last as a regional Arab conflict in Yemen forced Nasser to retreat
from the initiative with the United States8. This can be viewed as arguably one of the most pivotal
moments in the United States’ diplomatic relations in the Middle East. It is often lost in traditional
history books, but the events of the Yemen conflicts in the 1960’s drew Egypt away and transformed the
United States’ multilateral rapprochement strategy in the region into a unilateral one9; with Israel
benefiting immensely and other Arab states looking on with anguish.
It is important to acknowledge this historical juncture to defy the general consensus of America’s
whole-head support for Israel since 1948. Kennedy wanted to grow the United State’s stance in the
Middle East through a multilateral initiative involving both Israel and Arab states. That vision was
interrupted with Nasser’s pivot over Yemen, and then lost on a Dallas boulevard in November of 1963.
The next presidential administrations, by keeping to the Israeli support, and never fully rekindling the
multilateral initiative, would pave the way for a strong US-Israeli relationship to be born - aggravating
geopolitics in the Middle East.
Under the Johnson administration the true disparity between Israel and its Arab neighbors was
realized in June of 1967 in the “6 Days War” on the Sinai Peninsula between Israel and Egypt. In an
attempt to aid the struggle and find a diplomatic solution the United States imposed an arms embargo on
the region, including Israel10. However, the ban was lifted by the end of the year and Israel regained its
military support from the United States, giving wind to Israel domestic support in the United States.
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations had been working on a “Twin Pillar” plan involving
the build up of Iran and Saudi Arabia as “proxies” against the Soviet wave11, but events, most notably the
1979 revolution forced the U.S to refocus their approach away from the renewed multilateral approach
envisioned by Kennedy12. Following Israel’s success in the “Six Days War”, and the changing political
environment in the Arab States in the 1970’s, the Carter administration began to solidify the unilateral
support approach to build Israel up as a strategic military power in the Middle East. Israel’s build up and
newfound nuclear arms capability was successful in deterring the Soviets, but it made for turbulent
political sea amongst the Arab states against the United States and Israel13.
The United States was now supporting a country which was aggravating the entire Middle East
by flexing its military power and advancing its territory further into Palestine. Finally, in the 1990’s the
Clinton administration made the attempt to settle the Israel — Palestine dispute so to resolve greater
8
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tension and animosity rising from Arab players against the United States, which were hurting U.S
economic and oil interests. Both efforts, the 1993 Oslo peace talks and the various meetings at Camp
David between the leaders of all three countries. The deals all fell through because The U.S and Israel
were unwilling to move within the Palestinian ZOPA (request for the return of refugees)14.
Tensions continued to rise against the United States from Arab activists because of their close
relationship with Israel. The attack on Manhattan, Washington, and Pennsylvania in September of 2001
greatly escalated the conflict. President Bush went ahead with a justified war against terror and then a war
in Iraq, which led to more civil unrest in the region and ultimately destroyed America’s position as a peace
maker. At this time, Iran’s military nuclear program was uncovered, which would end up becoming
an even larger deterrence to finding a peace between Israel and Palestine. Before moving on and
discussing the nuclear conflict, it is imperative to tell the other side of the story.

A History — The United States and Iran:
It is of foremost importance to recognize Iran’s long history as a sovereign — geopolitical force in
the Middle East. After WWII, Iran was viewed as an asset in the United State’s Cold War strategy, as
evident by the “Twin Pillar” plan first implemented during the Eisenhower administration and then further
carried out under the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations15in an attempt to fill the void being
left by the British withdrawal in the region16. The plan invested in both Saudi Arabia and Iran in to foster
relationships and block Soviet encroachment. Dr. Jubin Goodarzi, of Webster University’s Geneva
location, explains how Iran was a vital chattel to the United States because of its immense natural
resources and geo-strategical position on the border of the Soviet blockade. Widely unrecognized, Israel
too viewed Iran, under the Shah’s leadership, as a partner in the region for security and natural resources17.
The relationship with Iran fortified through the Johnson and Nixon years to the point where the
Shah leader of Iran publicly referred to the U.S and Iran as “natural allies”18. Most scholars view this time
as Iran being set up as a proxy state for the United States, but in reality, under Nixon’s leadership, the
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Shah experienced “political influence in Washington”19. Remembering Churchill’s vulgar words about
alliances, this is where problems begin to arise. The Iranian clerical leadership and populous was unhappy
with the Shah’s close relationship with the United States because they viewed his leading principles too
close to the Americans’20. There is much speculation over the true cause of the Iranian revolution of 1979,
but the point remains true that it was the end to friendly ties with the U.S. America’s friend, the Shah, was
exiled, American hostages were taken, and the Carter administration was forced to retaliate diplomatically.
It is important to remember at this point the initial Kennedy approach of multilateral
rapprochement throughout the Middle East — in 1979, both Egypt and Iran have been lost, and it is this
juncture Dr. Goodarzi points to as the pivot point where the United States begins to grow a unilateral
alliance with Israel21. With Iran out of the picture, Israel was the strongest asset the United States had left
and ensuing U.S presidential administrations greatly strengthened the relationship via weapon sales and
direct aid22. The Persian Gulf War, where the U.S backed Iraq against Iran, further escalated conflict with
Iran.
It is here public propaganda, from Israeli and American forces begin projecting Iran in a bad light.
Iran attempts to counter the propaganda efforts in the U.S with its FAIR (Foundation for American Iranian
Relations), but it does not gain any traction. Israel continues to be the sole benefactor of U.S support
under the Clinton years23; when Israeli Prime Minister Rabin “joined American supporters of Israel in
persuading the Clinton Administration and the US Congress to isolate and punish Iran economically and
diplomatically”24. At this point, Iran is subject to U.S imposed sanctions dating back to the American
retaliation of the 1979 revolution and the United States is clearly a strong partner with Israel, a nation Iran
views with animosity because of its actions against Palestine. The result is an absence of diplomatic
relations between the United States and Iran, something as dangerous as a nuclear weapon itself.
At this time, Iran was building a covert military nuclear program to match a similar program
being developed by Saddam Hussain’s government in Iraq. The lack of diplomatic relations between the
United States and Iran inevitably leads to ignorance and then stirs fears, which is what happened in 2002
when the world learned of the covert Iranian nuclear program; and this is where both historical stories
come together.

19 Alvandi,
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The Nuclear Factor:
In the midst of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the global community was anxious
about security. The information uncovering a covert nuclear program in Iran was taken as an immediate
threat to global security, and much of the story behind the development of such a program was lost in a
fog of anxiety. A released U.S National Intelligence Estimate25 report furthers this truth and states how
Iran lost its motivation to construct a nuclear weapons program in 2003, the same year Saddam’s
government quickly fell during the U.S — U.K invasion of Iraq.
The information in the National Intelligence Estimate was not released to the public, and Iran’s
nuclear developments were further used as a propaganda tool by individuals concerned with Israeli
security, including primarily Benjamin Netanyahu.
In 2002, President Bush was putting pressure on Israel to find a two state solution with the
Palestinians26, something many past U.S presidents had tried and failed to accomplish. Bush saw peace on
the Sinai Peninsula as a method of an overall peace in the Middle East and an end to the terrorist violence
witnessed only a year ago. The president gave a speech outlining the “road map of peace”between Israel
and Palestine with a two state solution in 200227. Since that sunny afternoon in the Rose Garden, the plan
has never been spoken of again to the American people on a large stage, and was particularly absent in all
of the President’s future State of the Union Addresses28. Iran, however, and its nuclear threat, was
prominent in every State of the Union Address Bush delivered during his time in office.
The president classified Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil”, and linked it to terror operations similar
al-qaeda. Iran was guilty of its association with terror, but it is a fallacy associate the organizations Iran
was associated with to al-qaeda and similar groups. The latter had the intentions to completely over throw
liberalism in the Middle-East, while Hezbollah and other like groups were concentrated on the Israel
Palestine conflict. It is imperative to break here and condemn all types of terrorist action and support the
United State’s mission to wage a fight against it, but it is critical to look beyond the violence to the root of
the conflict in an attempt to find a sustainable diplomatic solution.
Bush was on track with his “road map of peace”, but he changed course. Why the tack away
from a Palestine accord? Evidence exists to show the same approach taken by Israeli leaders since the

25 Albright,

David and Brannan, Paul. “The New National Intelligence Estimate on Iran: A Step in the Right

Direction”
26

Gilboa, Eytan and Inbar, Efraim. “US — Israeli Relations in a New Era: Issues and challenges after 9/11”.

27

“President Discusses Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East”. White House

28

“Sate of the Union Addresses” U.S National Archives
15

Falacci
early 1990s29. Netanyahu has made a two decade long campaign “crying wolf”30 about Iran developing a
nuclear weapon in a matter of months to use against Israel. Marc Finaud, an associate for the Geneva
Center for Security Policy, explains how this tactic is an attempt to display a threatened Israel so to
transfer focus away from the necessary work towards an accord with Palestine. His numerous interviews
on American national networks and speeches on Capitol hill always focus on the Iran threat and
exemplify his attempt to alter the the global focus away from Palestine. Mr. Finaud attributes this to
Israeli domestic politics and sees it as Netanyahu avoiding the Palestine issue for his own political ora31.
So, why then are the ideologies of an Israeli Prime Minister taking preference over the will of an
American President on such the critical issues as peace with Palestine and a nuclear Iran? The evidence
from 2002 to the end of his term, despite the now public National Intelligence Estimate showing a stop to
Iranian nuclear ambitions in 2003, of President Bush leaving the Palestine issue behind only to make Iran
the larger issue, perfectly mirroring Netanyahu, shows how the ever so close relationship between the U.S
and Israel construes American foreign policy. The aforementioned United States history with both Israel
and Iran illustrates the root causes for Israel becoming more closely aligned with the U.S than Iran, but the
implications of such a history has lead to a song U.S domestic support for Israel, which is making it
exponentially more difficult for the United States to properly work with Iran over the current nuclear
issue. Those implications have lead to the construction of what many scholars define as the “Israel lobby”,
and it is the work of this group which must be analyzed to find a way through to a secure accord with
Iran today.
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The Lobby:

During the Kennedy administration the Israel lobby within the United States was nonexistent32;
however the Israeli ‘supposed’ victory in June of 1967 led to a zionist revival in American politics33 and
the start of a wave of domestic support for the Jewish state. Israel had triumphed over their Arab
neighbors and evidence showed growing support coming from the United States. This allowed
“American Jews to flex their political muscles”34, and ultimately became the inception of the “Israel
lobby” within the United States.
Most political lobbies are easily identifiable. Individual ‘lobbyists’ represent the organization and
campaign finance statistics can be used to depict the true political power the group has over congress and
the greater American politic. This can not be said for the Israel lobby in the United States. The wave first
witnessed in 1967 has mounted a large and multifaceted domestic support for the Jewish state. While
some large firms, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), appear to be the full
lobby, they only represent a small portion of the overwhelming political clout backing Israeli interests
within the United States.
In university halls across the country stances of overwhelming support for Israel by the United
States can be widely heard. The same is said for community churches, town halls, and most importantly
the United States Congress. The lobby has effectively created what this paper will come to define as the
‘wheel of influence’. American advocates for Israel, through many different methods, have been able to
alter the county’s foreign policy towards the Jewish state like no other lobby has been able to do. Last
year AIPAC spent an estimated three million dollars in total35 for lobbying efforts, but by no means does
this number encapsulate the power of the lobby, as the petroleum lobby’s annual expenditures add up to
142 million usd36. Direct expenditures only represent a small way by which the lobby has constructed the
‘wheel of influence’. The lobby pursues two main strategies of influence with the first being the
persuasion of congress and the executive branch, and the second being how the lobby “strives to ensure
public discourse about Israel portrays it in a positive light”37. The latter is most effective and is what
makes the lobby unique.
The overarching goal of the lobby is to build a positive public stance for Israel. The lobby has
waged war on Americans’ ideologies to protect Israel and to ensure there is not an “open debate on issues
32

Bass, Warren. ”Support Any Friend” 4

33

Oren, “Playing for the Brink” 309-312

34

Ibid. 309-312

35

Open Secrets - AIPAC

36

Open Secrets - Oil

37

Mearshiemer, John and Walts, Stephen. “The Israel Lobby and American Foreign Policy” p. 14-26.
17

Falacci
involving Israel, because an open debate might cause Americans to question their level of support that
they currently provide”38. Their dynamic strategy has been to target sources of influence, mainly the
media, academia, and religion.
By targeting all sources simultaneously the lobby has been able to develop a favorable American
consensus of the Jewish State. The largest piece of the Israel lobby is actually the large Christian Zionist
movement — “rooted in America’s Puritan beginnings , standing even today upon the general public’s
belief that the State of Israel came into the world in fulfillment of biblical prophecy and that the wellbeing
of America requires her leaders to display a preference for Israel’s cause in all the challenges that she
faces”39. Leaders of the Israel lobby have made large strides to unite with the American Christian
following, and large numbers of ministers and faith leaders across the country have made it a priority to
speak about the importance of standing with, and protecting Israel. The large Christian family in the
United States has the greatest influence over Congress because of its many million followers40. Tapping
into the large Christian following in America has also greatly helped the lobby swing popular support and
aided it in forcing its views on the American media.
The lobby has been able to flex its persuasive power utilizing mainstream media outlets, such as
national papers and broadcasting networks. Whether the peoples’ general political beliefs, already
influenced by the lobby in other ways, shape the editor’s choice of what to put up on the ticker, or the
lobby itself directly influencing the media high offices around the country is a question of the chicken or
the egg? The point remains, however, that the American media portrays Israel in a favorable light. News
editors, such as Robert Bartley, the former editor for the Wall Street Journal, have claimed, “Shamir,
Sharon, Bibi — whatever those guys want is pretty much fine by me”41. Another example of the
influence the lobby has over the media came in April of 2006 when scholar and NYU professor, Tony
Judt, was asked explicitly by an editor at the New York Times to include his Jewish heritage within the
opinion piece he was asked to produce in response to the Mearsheimer, Walts 2006 Harvard article42,
“The Israel Lobby And American Foreign Policy”; which was receiving large attention because of its
controversial views. The mainstream paper wanted to use the attention the piece was getting, but it was
not ready to openly stand with it. Having Judt, a member of the Jewish community, write the opinion
piece provided a barrier of protection. The media serves as a vital part of the ‘wheel of influence’ and
helps protect Israel in the American public interest.
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The media can be viewed so much however as an intermediary for the lobby. Influencing the
public helps then influence the media and so on. The lobby’s ties with the Christian following helps in
this mission, but perhaps a more clear substation is the lobby’s efforts in “policing academia”43. As
astonishing as it is to think free thought is being challenged inside the very country that is its largest
advocate the lobby has been able to manipulate how Israel is viewed in academic institutions across the
the country. They lobby has set up a “watch dog” system on college campuses and academic forums to
ensure Israel is protected from critical scholars or academic contrarians. In the last decade AIPAC has
tripled its funding for campus initiatives in an attempt to add to Jewish student involvement on
campuses44. One shocking example was when Colonel L. Wilkerson, professor at The George Washington
University and former strategist for Colin Powell, was emailed sent an email after a lecture he gave at a
U.S university where he had mentioned the very article published by Mearshiemer and Walts, citing it as
an example of contrary scholarship. Allen Dershowitz, professor at Harvard University, sent the email
explaining his concern for Colonel Wilkerson using the article in his lecture because of its flaws, and even
attached his own critique45. Wilkerson can only draw the conclusion that Dershowitz’s actions are the
works of the Israel lobby “watch dog” initiative46. Clearly the lobby has been able to influence many
sources of public opinion within America, giving it large amounts of leverage over the country’s
politicians.
The ‘wheel of influence’ is completed once the sprouted ideologies from the public reach
politicians. Campaign finance is one way by which the lobby has been able to influence congress, but
even more effectively, it has created a political stance immune from party. Both sides of the aisle call for
support for Israel, and debate over the topic is viewed as “sensitive” and “politically dangerous”. No
politician wants to be viewed anti-semitic, or against helping a friend in the Middle East.
Through its many facets the lobby has deployed tactics to put Israel in a favorable light. Whether
through its media power, lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill, or celebrity filled annual galas the lobby has
charted a course for both public an political opinion; which fuel each other in the ‘wheel of influence’.
Using such ploys as Israel’s strategic location as an ally, the mutual interest against terror, and the desire
to promote liberty and freedom following the suffering of the Jewish people, has made Israel politically
untouchable and has altered American foreign policy47. Whether the lobby has directly affects foreign
policy is subject for the reader’s judgment, but there is indisputable evidence the lobby has crated an
“Atomic Bomb of Fear”, a term given by Jeremy Rabinovitz, former chief of staff to Rep. Lois Capps (D-
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California), a weapon used to deter public and political stances against Israel out of fear of retaliation48.
To put it simply, the lobby has created an environment where Israel exists in a positive light, because
anything else would be viewed as “anti-semitic. It is important to acknowledge the innate ties between
Israel and the United States common from a dynamic history of cooperation and a shared set of common
ideals. Dr. Goodarzi points to this being a stronger factor in connecting the two countries than simply the
lobby. Similar scholars choose to point to the strategic and historical constructs between both states to
explain their “special relationship”49, but the fact remains — the strong support of Israel has shaped
American foreign policy and is impacting the outcome of a nuclear deal with Iran.

The Effect:
Never before than in the last century have more conflicts risen because of alliances. From
Sarajevo to Belgium the world has witnessed the inception escalated conflict steaming from tethered
relationships amongst nations. Thomas Jefferson, in his inaugural address echoed the farewell remarks of
Washington by laying his foreign policy agenda as, “ peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all
nations - alliances with none.”50 Alliances make for turbulent conditions in the sea of foreign policy.
Kennedy, despite his intention to “support any friend”, was not in a position to construct an alliance with
any power in the Middle East.
In the last four decades the United States has not given more aid, nor sold more military assets to
any other country than it has to Israel. In addition to the estimated three billion dollars given to Israel via
direct foreign assistance each year51 and the over 140 billion dollars given as direct aid since the end of
WWII52, the United States has vetoed 33 UN security council in order to protect Israel53, including
resolutions which would have restricted Israel’s nuclear weapons program . Why does Israel, a developed
power receive so much support? It is because of domestic pressures inside of the United States and the
greater Israel lobby, this paper has not intention of further demonstrating the clear relationship between
the United States and Israel, but it must acknowledge the the resulting geopolitical in regard to Iran.
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The Tehran Aperture:
As the relationship between Israel and the United States has grown, the relationship between Iran
and the United Staes has dissipated. Are the two connected? Most defiantly. Iran’s diplomatic “intensions”
of destroying Israel are construed in harsh public light and taken out of context to portray Iran as an
irrational actor. This has primarily been done by the Israel lobby, but the truth, explained in an interview
with an Iran watcher working with the U.S Department of State who has asked to remain anonymous, is
that the Iranian central authority, throughout the course of its history, has transformed its policies to gain
domestic support and sovereignty over its populous54. This most relevant stride of Iran’s overt
condemning of Israeli geopolitical actions with the Palestinians is only an attempt to gain internal support
for the regime. According to Marc Finaud, the Iranian government has taken harsh stances against Israel in
an attempt to gain Muslim support within Iran. Mr. Finaud points to domestic intensions rather than
international intentions for the reasons behind the widely publicized threats to “wipe Israel off of the
planet”55. Israeli leaders, such as Benjamin Netanyahu, have used such negative Iranian propaganda of
their own positive propaganda; which has trickled inside of the United States by way of the lobby.
Whether it was President George W. Bush’s mention of Iran as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’ or one of
Netanyahu’s many warning speeches to the United States Congress Americans have been primed to
believe Iran is a rouge and dangerous state with the intentions of combatting both Israel and the United
States, especially pertaining to the country’s nuclear program. The truth could not be more far from this
folly.
Professor Jubin Goodarzi of Webster University based in Geneva Switzerland, an Iranian citizen,
points to the misconceptions over Iran’s nuclear program and explains their devastating consequences.
Iran began building a covert nuclear military program, along side their public civil nuclear energy
program, in the 1980’s in response to a similar program being built up by the Saddam Hussain regime in
neighboring Iraq56. The push for a military nuclear problem was purely defensive. The problem was the
way and the time the information was made public to the global community. Does I ran deserve a bomb?
Most certainly not. Allowing Iran to develop a nuclear weapon is clearly off the table because of the UN
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty57. Although Iran legally cannot produce a nuclear weapon,
making it more of a participating player in nuclear diplomacy, through similar policy to the (JPOA),
would enable the emergence of a safer nuclear environment in the Middle East58. The election of now
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Irani President Hassan Rouhani, a reform candidate, has been viewed as evidence showing Iran’s desire to
find diplomatic peace.
Some scholars believe an increased build up of power in Iran would ultimately lead to a more
peaceful bipolar system in the Middle East. Kenneth Waltz most notably suggested how Iran building a
nuclear weapon would not be a disaster, rather, “the best possible result: the one most likely to restore
stability to the Middle East”59. This comes from a bipolar realist theory: having two equal powers in a
region creates a standoff allowing for peace by way of mutual deterrence 60. Israel’s historic success in
maintaining its security position over other regional powers is viewed by Waltz as “unsustainable”, and
“Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies
anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again”61. Considering how analyst “have
guarded optimism that the consequences a nuclear-armed Iran are manageable”,62 a policy giving Iran a
larger stake in the regional nuclear security milieu could help stabilize power struggles and disputes.
The challenge to such an end is the fog which has formed from the United States’ history in the
Middle East and its relationship with Israel. Such a fog is blinding American foreign policy towards
working with Tehran leadership. The United States clearly has an interest to work with Iran to solve the
nuclear dispute, but in a liberal society domestic support against such an initiative because of ties with
Israel has made it exceptionally difficult to find such a peace. Kennedy, in his book, “Profiles in
Courage”, explains how in times where a populous is against a new approach for a greater peace it takes a
courageous leader who is willing to risk his own political ora for that of the greater good63.
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The Winds Clock:
Barack Obama, the young senator from Illinois, threw himself into a race for the White House
based on a mission of change. The American people, exhausted by two wars, were eager for new
leadership and Obama ran to deliver. He proposed a new mission where “the United States is to provide
global leadership grounded in the understanding that the world shares a common security and a common
humanity”64. He had a clear commitment to disarmament65 and a greater peace in the world led once
again by a cooperative American diplomatic effort.
The young politician saw a moment for the American movement to be “seized anew”66, where the
military heavy foreign policy of the last decade could be replaced with an America aimed at diplomacy
and open dialogue with the rest of the world. Obama knew the war in Iraq had upset many a thousand
Americans and had cast a shadow over the array of freedom and liberty established by past American
generations throughout the world. Begun in an opinion piece in Foreign Affairs he built his campaign in
direct contrast to the Iraq war and similar policies to separate himself from his political rivals and propose
a new outlook for orchestrating peace, starting with a renewed effort in the conflict between Israel and
Palestine.
Most of his 2008 run for the White House revolved around ending the war in Iraq. One of the
most prevalent factors was his belief that the war was serving as a distraction to peace work in the region.
He claimed how the leaders of Israel and Palestine have looked to America in the past to “ build the road
to a lasting peace”, but after the Bush administration neglected such a task the leaders “in recent years
have too often looked in vain”67. The presidential hopeful cited former leaders, such as Kennedy and
Roosevelt, for their commitments of using diverse strategies to work with foreign leaders to resolve
conflict and foster an American idea of peace. Throughout his campaign he made clear and poignant
statements towards ending the conflict on the Sinai Peninsula and beginning a new dialogue with Iran to
prevent them from developing nuclear weapons, while showing the Iranian people “what could be gained
from fundamental change: economic engagement, security assurances, and diplomatic relations”68. This
seems promising, but would the plan fall to the folly of the Israel lobby as past presidential initiatives
had?
Was Obama supposed to win? In the eyes of the lobby - no. Hilary Clinton had received an
immense amount of Jewish support throughout her career as senator from New York up until her 2008 bid
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for the White House69. On the other side of the aisle, Republicans, especially the likes of John McCain
were receiving support from AIPAC and other large Israeli machines, especially American Christian
society, which was very much against Obama’s candidacy. The field seemed to be stacked against him,
but Obama prevailed. The young candidate truly represented change, especially the way he ran his
campaign, which was a new bread of American political strategy grounded on individualism70. Looking
specifically at his foreign policy ideals, Obama would have been met with much more confrontation had
he been proposing a renewed strategy of appeasement and dialogue in the Middle East by its self, but he
was not. All of his rhetoric about his diplomatic vision of foreign policy was surrounded by the desire to
bring the war in Iraq to an end, something the American people so greatly wanted. His opponents were
too tied to the war, and he was able to triumph.
Whether it was his decision to form a new foreign policy mentality by itself, or the goal of ending
the Iraq war that led him to such a stance is not worth analyzing because when President Barack Obama
delivered his inaugural address on a chilly Washington after noon in January of 2009 the world listened,
primed with that idea of change, to hear the new president’s outlined methodologies for solving the
conflicts around the globe - the same way it listened to a young Jack Kennedy a half century ago.
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Current Affairs:
Last month, New York Times columnist, Thomas Friedman, met with president Obama in the
Oval Office to discuss his “Obama Doctrine”— a foreign policy of engagement, while maintaining all
capabilities71. Not since 1979 has any United States presidential administration had more interaction with
Iran. President Obama has stayed true to his campaign commitment to find new grounds for foreign
policy in the Middle East. In January of 2013 Secretary of State, John Kerry, and his negotiating team
made history by reaching a temporary accord with Iranian officials and the (P5+1)72 to work towards
reducing UN sanctions against Iran in return for the Iranians to stop all progress on their nuclear military
program. The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), designed by the (P5+1) and signed in Geneva, was a
comprehensive agreement enabling “Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein”73. These obligations
being that Iran would have to “dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%. No reconversion
line”74, restrict development in certain nuclear facilities, and allow for daily inspections of its nuclear
program by the International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA).
In compliance with these requests, the P5+1 would “pause efforts to further reduce Iran's crude oil
sales, enabling Iran's current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil”75. The
nature of the crude oil sanctions allows China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey to
maintain their current average level of imports from Iran”76. Since its implementation, Iranian oil exports
have risen this year by 28 %, according to a report filed by the International Energy Agency in Paris 77,
while Iran’s nuclear program has remained stagnant. The accord, and the agreements that have occurred
since, exemplify the Obama administration’s pivot away from Bush era diplomacy, influenced by the
Israel lobby, and into a new era of more communicative dialogue with Iran.
It is necessary to take yet another pause to analyze the full relationship between the United States
and Israel. There is strictly no dispute. Israel is the strongest partner the United States currently has in the
Middle East. President Obama has recognized how they are they only functioning democracy in the area
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and how an attack on Israel would be a fundamental failure of his administration78. The president has
made his mission clear how he intends to maintain the highest level of security for Israel while pursuing a
diverging foreign policy with leaders in Iran in an attempt to reach a more sustainable peace for all actors,
especially Israel.
It is also imperative to acknowledge how the current nuclear deal with Iran has been influenced by
the tough sanction program placed on the country by the (P5+1) during the Bush administration, which
has made the Iranian people eager for change . The U.S Department of State and President Obama
highlight fundamental changes occurring in Iran, which have led them to chose a new approach aimed at
overarching peace. The election of Iranian president Rouhani, a reformist candidate who ran on the
promise to work towards ending the sanctions, and the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, allowing his
negotiating team to make certain concessions during the talks in Geneva, showed the Obama
administration Iran was ready to work towards rejoining the international community79.

The Challenge:
The change in policy, while it is working, has been met with heavy confrontation from Israeli
leaders. Prime Minister Netanyahu is voicing concerns that the current (JPOA) agreement is only
beneficial to Iran and threatens the security outlook in the Middle East. While answering questions during
his testimony to congress, Kerry explained how Prime Minister Netanyahu “is wrong”, and how Iran’s
current compliance with the (JPOA) has made Israel and the rest of the global community safer today
than it was before the signing of the agreement. At the time of this statement however, Iran’s nuclear
development remains intact, it has been continuously caught hiding pieces of its nuclear program80
Sanction easing by the (JPOA) has increased Irani prosperity and decreased incentives of other countries,
such as China, to be strict with Iran because of regenerated oil trade81. The Israeli camp is convinced
rapport diplomatic relations with Iran is dangerous. While peaceful talks between Iran and the (P5+1)
signal a possible status quo trajectory, they claim there is unsurmountable evidence showing the currently
designed system cannot function as a sustainable solution.
The greatest evidence showing the push back has been a letter signed by 50 Republican senators
addressed to the Supreme Leader of Iran outlining their intent of overriding any of the president’s current
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negotiations regarding the nuclear accord through their parliamentary power over the executive branch82.
When interviewed, the U.S diplomat Iran Watcher cited the letter as an ignorant ploy, which puts the
negotiations in danger83. The letter was then followed by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to the U.S
House of Representatives to deliver a speech against the President’s current diplomacy efforts. The Prime
Minister was greeted like a rock star and America’s mission was immediately questioned.
It is hard to directly connect the Israel lobby’s role in influencing the 50 senators to draft their
letter or in the invitation of the Israeli Prime Minister to deliver a speech on Capitol Hill without the
invitation from the Commander in Chief. Academic papers have no place for speculation, so speculation
must not be drawn to show how the lobby has influenced the current affairs. However, patterns can be
realized and trends can by analyzed. The Republican party has traditionally been heavily connected to a
favorable Israeli stance and even more so connected to America’s Christian following; which as
aforementioned makes up the most powerful piece of the Israel lobby. It can be said that the power of the
‘wheel of influence’ has become so engrained in the American political system that it is difficult to
distinguish it acting as an individual player. Instead it is correct to assert how the American politic has
grown more supportive of Israeli favoring policy as a result of the various parts of the lobby’s work. With
this acknowledged, however, this stance is being challenged by the wills of the Obama administration.

The President’s Task:
The “Obama Doctrine”, as recently named by Thomas Friedman, has created a new profile for
American foreign policy — one might say a ‘profile in courage’. The shift of strategy to a more open
relationship with Iran exhibits the President’s desire to focus on the larger picture in the Middle East.
Upon taking office he proclaimed how the world was discouraged at the United States following the war
in Iraq, and how he hoped to change that discouragement into engagement84. Iran is, as some have
referred to it lately, a “regional superpower” in the Middle East85. Its geopolitical location and immense
natural resources make Iran a strategic player, but even more important is its diaspora — the same
diaspora that has been ruthlessly targeted by Israel advocates for the last two decades.
The Iranian people have been portrayed as an evil and irrational group with the sole intent of
eliminating Israel. While there are members of a high clerical group who have projected these threats, the
greater population is held together by common ideologies of unity and a shared commitment to prosperity.
They are a strong people who have managed to grow an oil industry, auto industry, and an overall middle
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class under heavy international sanctions86. They want peace and liberty, and the Obama administration
has acknowledged their plea. Iran has been a prevalent topic in the latter half of Obama’s State of the
Union Addresses, but not the same way as it was part of George W. Bush’s addresses. Iran’s nuclear threat
still remains the most prominent issue by far. Both administrations accept the task of ensuring Iran does
not get a nuclear weapon and strongly emphasize Israeli security. However, while Bush advocated for
stricter international pressures87, Obama has chosen a strategy of more engagement , something the Israel
lobby has warned against, but nevertheless, something that is working more effectively than previous
measures.
The nature of sanction regimes is playing against the Israel lobby. Despite Netanyahu’s request
on Capitol Hill for stricter sanctions, and AIPAC’s outline for heftier88 policies, Obama has stayed
committed to his cause for a diplomatic approach, and for good reason.
The sanction policies were simply not working. According to Pietre Cleppe, an associate at the
Brussels based think tank Open Europe, sanction policies hurt the middle class, which inevitable increases
the power authority of the country’s leaders because working people are forced to rely on them more89. In
the case of Iran the sanctions had demoralized the economy, but were not stopping progress to a nuclear
war. The U.S diplomat, who will remain anonymous, explained how the diplomatic approach with Iran is
working much more effectively than the sanction policy had, and that an appeasement approach would be
“symbolic, to show that sanctions have been lifted” and a prospective relationship between the two side
would be suggested. Iran’s return to the negotiating table is “attributable less to sanctions and more to
Iran’s perceptions of U.S. flexibility”90 and “there is no demonstrable causal relationship between the
existence or level of sanctions against Iran and Iran’s willingness to negotiate”91.
The U.S sanction initiative has long been established, and, “expecting a recalculation of this
nature by Iran simply on the basis of reiterated international “demands” or weak targeted sanctions—
particularly without a credible threat of consequent military action for defiance—could appear to verge on
quixotic”92. In a testimony given to the U.S House Foreign Relations Committee Secretary of State, John
Kerry, affirmed these relicts as he explained how before the Joint Plan of Action diplomatic deal, Iran was
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only a few months from breakout93, but after the deal, breakout has been pushed back to a year. Kerry
affirmed how Israel is safer under the (JPOA) than it was before. Despite this information, the domestic
Israel lobby in the United States has continued to mobilize in opposition. It was after Kerry’s protest the
50 senators drafter the letter to the Supreme Leader, a letter the U.S diplomat interviewed cited as
dangerous94.
Part of the answer resides with fear, something the President acknowledged in his interview with
Thomas Friedman, explaining how “Israel has the right to be concerned” for Iran is a country who has
openly threatened Israel’s existence. The other, and more interesting part of the answer resides in
ignorance. Marc Finaud explains how Iran’s propaganda is not as aggressive as it is read, and how the
core issue Iran has with Israel is their settlement in Palestinian territory95. Mr. Finaud explains how Iran
would “recognize” Israel should a two state resolution be drawn, and acknowledges slight progress
towards such an end, as the Supreme Leader now referring to Israel by its name and not by the “Zionist
Regime” term96. He points to similar destructive propaganda on Israel’s side, where talk against Iran has
become a distraction away from efforts towards peace with Palestine. Both instances of propaganda are
directed at the populous in an attempt to gain political support. They are not outlines of foreign policy.
President Obama understands this and knows the United States will not be in a position to negotiate if it is
held to either one of the relics. The task is avoiding the domestic pressure.
President Obama is at a juncture between doing what his administration finds to be the best
solution for Iran and doing what domestic forces are pressuring hims to do; a very similar juncture to what
then Senator John QuincyAdams found himself in when dealing with the British trade embargo in 1807,
or the juncture Senator Daniel Webster was in the midst of over the Compromise of 1850 between
the Northern and Souther States involving slavery. The latter of the three statesmen found their political
end at these junctures. They went against their constituents and never recovered. Adams was regarded as a
traitor when he sided with President Thomas Jefferson on the trade embargo. He ended up resining his seat
after Massachusetts in the wake of protests from Massachusetts voters. Daniel Webster, after giving a
speech in favor of concessions to the South saw his presidential aspirations fade as northern voters
threatened his political life in protest. Both men could be accused of treason of liberty, for they went
against their constituents — the people who they were supposed to be representing. Then Senator John
Kennedy highlights these men’s actions of extreme patriotism in “Profiles in Courage” to show how it is
sometimes necessary for statesmen to look beyond the populous and focus on the greater good, to steer

93 Breakout is defined as the time it would take for the development of a nuclear weapon, including the acquisition
of enough fissile material.
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clear of ignorance and work towards resolving problems to great for society to comprehend. In both
instances, the constituents were concerned with their personal affairs — not those of the United States.
Today, the Obama administration is dealing with an affair that transcends national borders,
transcends religious confrontation, and evermore transcends political belief. The Middle East is a
penetrated political system, “one that is neither effectively absorbed by outside powers, nor released from
the outsider’s tight hold”97. Such a system obscured diplomatic negotiation because inside and outside
factors are constantly working against each other. All three actors must realize their own serenity in the
conflict and must recognize their individual obligations to move forward towards a common peace. For
the United States, and the Obama administration, it is recognizing the dangerous domestic ties to Israel
and the fogged view of Iranian diplomacy.
Members of the U.S Congress, such as U.S House Foreign Relations Chair, Ed Royce, has called
for congressional review of Obama’s deal with Iran, but the President is not backing down, claiming he
will veto any legislation enforcing a congressional review of the deal. For too long domestic efforts in the
United States have been working to create a bad image of Iran. The initial part of this paper outlined the
vast ‘wheel of influence’ the Israel lobby has over the U.S politic. This is not a place to speculate a direct
tie between congressional pressure on the president and the Israel lobby, however a historical review of
previous political events dealing with Iran and Israel exhibit a pattern taking effect, most notably in
2002-2003 when President Bush was moved away from his “Road Map of Peace” between Israel and
Palestine and towards a punishment campaign against Iran98. Last decade the political environment was
different, but the pattern remains.
In this decade events have occurred making the political contrast even more visible. The election
of Rouhani, a change from the hardline politics of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and a growing reformist
movement in a young Iranian population signal a desire to work towards rejoining the international
community. Dr. Jubin Goodarzi, in an interview, offered an interesting relic, when he explained how
while dinning in an Iranian restaurant in Tehran, where a large congregation of Chinese business men
were meeting for lunch, a waiter came over to his table and, with his eyes on the Chinese group, joked,
“when are the Americans coming back?”99. The U.S diplomat interviewed found this to be a perfect
anecdote to explain the Iranian diaspora’s desire to work towards progress. They do not hate Americans,
and they are not an irrational population with a desire to destroy liberty or start a religious war like much
of the media portrays. There are a few clerical leaders who have made stances against the West and
against Israel, and these must be taken cautiously, however the intent of such stances is purely political.
Islam, Christianity, Judaism — it is all the same story. Mecca is believed to be the house of Adam and
Eve, while Ala is simply the arabic tongue for God; in fact, the whole region of the Middle East is
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outlined in a shape of an angel (as shown on the cover photo of this paper). The conflict is not rooted in
beliefs it is rooted in anger over Israel’s actions of occupation on the Sinai Peninsula. Fear has changed
the nature of the conflict, but fear is a liar and ignorance is so sure of itself. Fear is also what is in the way
of America from solving the problem.
The late Tony Judt of New York University also fell victim to a similar occurrence to the ones
which brought down Quincy Adams and Webster. His readers objected to his claims about Israel domestic
pressures on Washington. While he left the direct link between the Israel lobby and American foreign
policy up for judgment, as this paper does, hesitated true to the notion that America has remained stagnant
in the conflicts of the Middle East because of fears of anti-semitism; a fear that can be witnessed in all
levels from political leadership to the average citizen talking politics over a cup of coffee. Just claims this
fear has , “corroded American domestic debate”100 and caused the public to “censoriously rebuke any
public figure at home who tries to break from the consensus”101— leading to a blind support of Israeli
policy in the Middle East. It bears repeating how dangerous such blind support has become, and how:
“Israel is the only Middle Eastern state known to possess genuine and lethal weapons of mass
destruction. By turning a blind eye, the US has effectively scuttled its own increasingly frantic efforts to
prevent such weapons from falling into the hands of other small and potentially belligerent states.
Washington’s unconditional support for Israel even in spite of (silent) misgivings is the main reason why
most of the rest of the world no longer credits our good faith”102.
Whether it is the Israel lobby directly, or its second hand effects, America has clearly been fogged from
looking at the overall picture in the Middle East. This dangerous fog has led to becoming a “fog of war”
in not to distant U.S history103. It is clear how Iran must be viewed as an asset rather than a liability.
Robert Baer, a former C.I.A operative, has claimed Iran to be so important to Middle East geopolitics that
it should be viewed as a stronger potential ally than Israel104. This paper will not go as far to dismiss
Israel’s role as the strongest U.S ally in the Middle East, but it is imperative to view the broader outlook
currently taking shape in the region. Judt claims the power Israel has in the domestic United States could
become their folly because a peace indicative, lead by the United States, appears to be the only way for
real stability in the conflicts with Iran and other actors in the region, and the only way towards full Arab
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recognition of Israel, as outlined by Oslo agreement105. The U.S, currently cannot play such a role because
it has been “blinded” by whichever Israeli forces one judges adequate. This is not, in the words of Dr.
Goodarzi, “not a zero sum game” — as offered by Carl Brown106 because it does not require either state
to give something up for the other’s gain. A peaceful deal between Iran and the United States will lead
to a more secure Israel. It is then in Israel’s best interest for the United States to continue the diplomatic
approach it is on with Iran because without the United States Israel has no other friends in the
world107. President Obama has been voicing, in the Friedman interview and elsewhere, that his approach
keeps Israeli interest in the highest priority. The challenge, however, remains of being able to go through
with it.
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Conclusion:
Kennedy set out to write “Profiles in Courage” to display the resilient acts of few American
statesman who, in our history, had the courage to stand the threat of treason in the face and make the
critical decisions to tack away from the populous and towards an unpopular resolution for the greater
interest of the country. The young Senator from Massachusetts was unaware of how his future relations
with Israel would bring about yet another instance requiring the same breed of courage. This paper has
covered a dense topic and has required a dense analysis, but it deserves a concise conclusion: There are
clearly factors in play which have led the United States to have a overly strong alliance with Israel.
Whether a specific Israel domestic lobby is at fault or whether it has strictly been ties with Israeli
throughout a dynamic history the reader is left to judge. The fact of the matter stays true, however, the
relationship is dangerous to the outcome of the nuclear accord with Iran, as well as the greater peace
outlook in the Middle East. Such a danger requires unparalleled bravery in leadership to break through the
status quo. Whether Barack Obama has enough force behind him to blow away the fog blinding the
interests of the United States is still to be determined. The final remark must be clear. The work of this
paper is in no way to suggest a lack of support, for Israel, a country that will remain one of the United
State’s strongest allies in the Middle East. The tack in policy offered here is not a tack away from Israel, it
is a tack out of a fog towards Israeli sustainable security and towards a greater peace in the Middle East
— let us all pray the wind is favorable on the other side.
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